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Abstract
We consider the division of a finite number of homogeneous divisi-
ble items among three players. Under the assumption that each player
assigns a positive value to every item, we characterize the optimal al-
locations and we develop two exact algorithms for its search. Both the
characterization and the algorithm are based on the tight relationship
two geometric objects of fair division: the Individual Pieces Set (IPS)
and the Radon-Nykodim Set (RNS).
1 The Problem
This paper investigates the optimal allocation problem for a finite number
m of divisible and homogeneous objects, with M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, m ∈ N, di-
puted among three players. Players will be usually denoted as N = {1, 2, 3},
but roman numbers I, II and III will be employed in the pictures.
We write the matrix of evaluation as (aij)i∈N ;j∈M , where each entry aij
tells us the value that player i ∈ N assigns to item j ∈ M . We assume that
utilities are
normalized
∑
j∈M aij = 1, ∀i ∈ N
i.e., utilities attached to the q goods sum up to 1 for each player; and
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linear if player i gets share tj ∈ [0, 1] of item j and share tk ∈ [0, 1] of item
k, she gets a total utility of tjaij + tkaik.
Let X = {xij}i∈N ;j∈M , xij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ M be an allocation matrix,
with
∑
i∈N xij = 1, ∀j ∈ M and X ∈ X , where X is the set of all possible
allocations matrices. Let us label with Xˆ any integer allocations where xij ∈
{0, 1}, ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ M , and with Xˆ the set of such allocations. Any integer
allocation can be equivalently described by a vector x = (xj)j∈M such that
each component xj = I, II or III depending on whether x1j = 1, x2j = 1 or
x3j = 1. Define now, for any X ∈ X ,
a(X) =
(∑
j∈M
aijxij
)
i∈N
.
It is a vector in which each entry tells us, for any player, the total value that
she derives from the given allocation X.
We are going to search for an allocation X∗ which simultaneously satisfies
(Strong) Pareto Optimality (PO) There is no other allocation X′ ∈ X
such that [
ai(X
′) ≥ ai(X∗) i ∈ N
with strict inequality for at least one player.
Equitability (EQ) a1(X
∗) = a2(X∗) = a3(X∗)
The proposed allocation coincides with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (see
[10] and [9]) for bargaining problems.
A well-known procedure for two players is the Adjusted Winner (AW) (see
[4] and [5]). This procedure returns allocations that are not only PO-EQ but
also envy-free.
Throughout the rest of the work we are going to consider the following
simplifying assumption:
Mutual absolute continuity (MAC). Each player assigns a positive
value to any item
aij > 0 for any i ∈ N and j ∈M
When MAC holds a PO-EQ allocation always exists, and it coincides with
the maxmin allocation defined by
X∗ ∈ argmax
X∈X
{
min
i∈N
ai(X)
}
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2 Geometrical Framework
We are now going to review two geometric structures that are useful for the
analysis of PO and PO-EQ allocations. First of all we characterize the PO
allocations.
Theorem 1. (Theorem 1, [3], Proposition 4.3 [6]) Under MAC, an allocation
is PO iff, for some γ = (γ1, γ2, γ3) ∈
◦
∆2 the following holds:
xik > 0 if γiaik ≥ γjajk for any i, j ∈ N, k ∈M. (1)
We denote with Xγ = {xγik} any allocation satisfying (1)
2.1 The Partition Range
We consider the Individual Pieces Set IPS ⊂ R3 (see [2]), also known as
Partition Range, defined as follows
IPS = {a(X) : X ∈ X} .
Proposition 1. IPS = conv
(
a(Xˆ) : Xˆ ∈ Xˆ
)
.
Proof. First of all we show that all the extreme points of IPS, i.e. all points
in IPS which are not interior points of any segment lying in IPS, correspond
to integer allocations of the goods.
Argue by contradiction, and suppose that an extreme point of IPS corre-
sponds only to noninteger allocations of goods. Let Xn = {xnij} be any such
allocation. Since Xn is non-integer, there must exist a good j0 ∈M and two
players i1, i2 ∈ N such that, for some δ > 0
δ < xi1,j0 , xi2,j0 < 1− δ
The following must also hold:
ai,j0 6= 0 for at least an i ∈ {i1, i2} (2)
In fact, assuming ai1,j0 = ai2,j0 = 0 we can replace Xn with another allocation
Xt which is integer in the good j0 and such that a(Xn) = a(Xt). The argu-
ment can be replicated to other goods to conclude that (2) holds. Without
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loss of generality, we assume ai1,j0 6= 0 an consider two other allocations.
X+ =

xnij j 6= j0 or (j = j0 and i 6= i1, i2)
xnij + δ j = j0 and i = i1
xnij − δ j = j0 and i = i2
X− =

xnij j 6= j0 or (j = j0 and i 6= i1, i2)
xnij − δ j = j0 and i = i1
xnij + δ j = j0 and i = i2
Now ai1(X+)−ai1(X−) = 2δai1,0 6= 0. Therefore a(X+) 6= a(X−) and a(Xn)
is the midpoint of the segment [a(X+), a(X−)], yielding a contradiction. By
Carathe´odory’s Theorem (see for instance [8]), and the fact that IPS ⊂ R3,
every point of IPS is the convex combination of at most 4 extreme points of
IPS
The value of a PO-EQ allocation is the common coordinate of the inter-
section between the egalitarian ray, i.e. the orthant of the first quadrant in
R3, and the upper surface of IPS, denoted as the Pareto Boundary, thereon
PB. Proposition 1 shows that PB is composed of faces, denoted Pareto faces
(PF). MAC implies that no Pareto face is parallel to any of the coordinate
axes.
If we consider the partition range from above, Finding the PO-EQ alloca-
tion amounts to finding the face of the PB that contains the egalitarian ray
(actually more than one face may be involved if the egalitarian ray ”hits” an
edge, or coincides with an integer allocation), and then find the allocation of
the Pareto face which yields the optimal value (Figure 1(a)).
Consider, for any x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3+, the normalizing operator
N(x) =
(
x1
s(x)
,
x2
s(x)
,
x3
s(x)
)
with s(x) = x1 + x2 + x3
and define the Normalized Pareto Boundary, thereon NPB, as a ∆2 simplex
such that
NPB = {N(x) : x ∈ PB}
Then, the Pareto Faces partition the set NPB, and finding the PO-EQ
allocation amounts to finding the allocation corresponding to the center
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) on NPB (Figure 1(b)).
To find the PO-EQ allocations we will employ the following result valid
for general fair division problems (any number of players, completely divisible
and non-homogeneous goods).
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Figure 1: (a) The red dot indicates the value of the PO-EF allocation. (b) The same
picture from above
Theorem 2. (Proposition 6.1 in [6]) Consider the following function g :
∆2 → [0, 1]
g(γ) =
∑
i∈N
γiai(X
γ) γ = (γ1, γ2, γ3) ∈ ∆2
with Xγ PO allocation associated to γ by (1). Then
(i) The hyperplane
H(γ) =
{
(x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3 :
∑
i∈N
γixi = g(γ)
}
supports IPS at the point (a1(X
γ), a2(X
γ), a3(X
γ)), i.e.
(a1(X
γ), a2(X
γ), a3(X
γ)) ∈ H(γ)
and
∑
i∈N
γiyi ≤ g(γ) ∀(y1, y2, y3) ∈ P
(ii) The hyperplane H intersects the egalitarian ray at the point g(γ)(1, 1, 1)
(iii) The function g(·) is convex, and for any of its minimizing points γ∗
the hyperplane H(γ∗) supports IPS at a set of points containing the
PO-EQ allocation.
In [6] an algorithm that returns the leximin allocation is described. This
can be adapted to return the PO-EQ allocation in the present situation:
1. Find γ∗, an absolute minimum for g
2. Find the Pareto face corresponding to H(γ∗)
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3. Find the equitable allocation within the Pareto face
In order to fully adapt the algorithm to the present situation, we need to
better characterize the Pareto faces.
2.2 The Radon-Nykodim set
Figure 1(b) shows that the PB can be represented as a 2-dimensional simplex.
We will now consider another 2-dimensional simplex, due to Weller [11] and
extensively investigated by Barbanel [2], that enables us to represent the
items, the efficient partitions and the faces of PB into a single geometric
figure. Following [2], we refer to the Radon-Nikodyn set, thereon RNS, to
define this new simplex.
Each vertex of RNS represents a player. We next plot the single items
into RNS by considering the normalized vectors of evaluations of the single
items
anj = N(a·j) j ∈M
The normalized coordinates of all objects are plotted on a 2-dimensional
simplex where each vertex represents a player. Under MAC, anj ∈
◦
∆2 for each
j ∈M .
Definition 1. For each point β = (β1, β2, β3) ∈ RNS in the simplex, con-
sider the lines joining β with each vertex; we denote as disputing segments
the half open segments on those lines from β to the opposite side of each ver-
tex, with β excluded.
Definition 2. For each β ∈
◦
RNS, we derive the following Pareto Alloca-
tion Rule after β, thereon PAR(β), which delivers one or more PO allo-
cations under MAC (see theorem 10.9 in [2]). The disputing segments of β
divide the simplex in three parts, each a neighborhood of a vertex. The ob-
jects in each neighborhood are assigned to the player associated to the vertex.
Denote as Xβ any such allocation. In case the allocation is integer we will
use Xˆβ.
It is important to notice that the allocation rule may not be unique: In
case an object lies on one of the disputing segments of β, it can be considered
on both sides of the segment, and therefore it can be assigned to any of the
corresponding players, or it can be split between the interested players.
Every Pareto allocation lies on the upper border of the convex set IPS,
and a hyperplane supports IPS at this point. A more precise account of the
relationship between supporting hyperplanes and the Pareto allocation rule
is given by the following result.
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Theorem 3. (Theorem 2 in [1]) Assume MAC. If, for any x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈
◦
∆2,
we denote
RD(x) = N
(
1
x1
,
1
x2
,
1
x3
)
,
then, for any γ ∈ ◦∆2, the allocation Xγ satisfies PAR(β) with β = RD(γ).
Conversely, for any β ∈ RNS, the allocation rule Xˆβ supports P through the
hyperplane Hγ with γ = RD(β).
When, given β ∈ RNS, one or more objects lie on disputing segments, the
associated hyperplane supports all the integer allocations and their convex
hulls. This fact plays a crucial role in how the Pareto faces are generated; a
detailed explanation will be provided in proof of Theorem 4.
Definition 3. For any item j ∈ K we denote the segments joining anj to
each of the three vertices the supporting segments. Two items, j, k ∈ K
are support independent, or s-independent, if none of anj and a
n
k lie on the
supporting segments of the other item.
In Figure 2 we illustrate dividing and supporting segments of one or more
items.
I
III
II
aj
(a)
I
III
II
aj
ak
(b)
I
III
II
aj
ak
(c)
Figure 2: (a) disputing colored by orange and supporting segments colored by blue, (b)
two s-independent items, (c) two dependent items.
Proposition 2. The supporting segments of two items intersect exactly once
if and only if the two items are s-independent.
Proof. Suppose two items, j, h are s-independent. Then aj lies in the interior
of one of the triangles that the supporting lines of ah form in the RNS, and
does not lie on any of the disputing lines of the same item. The supporting
line of aj with the vertex on the other side of the triangle, will intersect a
supporting line of ah once, and this is the only possible intersection.
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Conversely, if two items are s-dependent, a supporting line of one of them
will be a subsegment of the supporting line of the other, yielding an infinite
number of intersections.
3 Pareto faces on the Radon-Nykodim set
The following lemma consider the situation in which there are other items
lying on the disputing segments between two players.
Lemma 1. Under MAC, the following statements hold:
(i) If a disputing segment between players i and j of a point β in RNS
contains only one item (namely, k), then the hyperplane with coeffi-
cients vector α = RD(b) supports the partition range IPS in a region
containing the line segment [a(Xˆ
k
i ), a(Xˆ
k
j )], where Xˆ
k
i (Xˆ
k
j respectively)
denotes the allocation in which all items but k are assigned according to
a common PAR compatible with the coefficients and item k is assigned
to player i (player j respectively).
(ii) If a disputing segment between players i and j of a point β in RNS
contains more than one item (namely, r items with r ≥ 2 and K =
{k1, . . . , kr}), than the hyperplane i (i) still supports the partition range
IPS in a region containing the line segment [a(Xˆ
K
i ), a(Xˆ
K
j )], where Xˆ
K
i
(Xˆ
K
j respectively) denotes the allocations in which all items but those
in K are assigned according to a common Pareto rule compatible with
the coefficients, and items in K are all assigned to player i (player j,
respectively). Moreover, each point of the line segment [a(Xˆ
K
i ), a(Xˆ
K
j )]
is obtained by splitting at most one item in K, while attributing the
remaining ones in K either to Player i or to Player j in their own
entirety.
Proof. (i) Let γ ∈ ◦∆2 be the coefficients vector of a hyperplane supporting
IPS and let β = RD(γ) ∈ RNS. Following PAR(β), two optimal integer
allocations are generated, which differ only in the allocation of item k: Xˆ
k
i ,
in which item k is assigned to player i, and Xˆ
k
j , in which item k is assigned
to player j. So, the hyperplane characterized by γ supports IPS in a(Xˆ
k
i )
and a(Xˆ
k
j ) and, by Proposition 1, the whole line segment [a(Xˆ
k
i ), a(Xˆ
k
j )].
(ii) Following the same line of reasoning adopted in (i), the evaluations
vectors a(Xˆ
K
i ) and a(Xˆ
K
j ) belong to the region where IPS supports the given
hyperplane, together with the line segment [a(Xˆ
K
i ), a(Xˆ
K
j )]
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We recall that goods ` ∈ K are characterized by the following relationship
γiai` = γjaj` > γhah` ` ∈ K .
Therefore, letting Ti =
∑
`∈K ai` and Tj =
∑
`∈K aj`, we have
Tj =
γiTi
γj
.
Moreover,
a(Xˆ
K
i ) = c + di a(Xˆ
K
j ) = c + dj
where c is the evaluation vector where all the goods but those in K are
assigned according to a compatible common Pareto rule, di = (Ti, 0, 0) and
dj = (0, Tj, 0), where, for simplicity, we assume that player i (player j, resp.)
occupies the first (second, resp.) coordinate.
Consider now an intermediate situation where a subset of goods H ⊂ K
are assigned to player i and the remaining ones in K are given to j. Denoting
with XˆH the corresponding allocation, we have
a(XˆH) = c + dH
with
dH =
(∑
`∈H
ai`, Tj −
∑
`∈H
aj`, 0
)
=
(∑
`∈H
ai`,
γi
γj
(Ti −
∑
`∈H
ai`), 0
)
=∑
`∈H ai`
Ti
di +
(
Ti −
∑
`∈H ai`
Ti
)
dj .
Letting t =
∑
`∈H ai`
Ti
we therefore have
a(xH) = ta(x
K
i ) + (1− t)a(xKj )
and a(xH) ∈ [a(xKi ), a(xKj )].
To prove the last statement, consider the collection Hp = {k1, . . . , kp},
p ≤ r and H0 = ∅. Clearly a(XˆHp), p = 0, 1, . . . , r spans the line segment
[a(Xˆ
K
i ), a(Xˆ
K
j )], with a(XˆH0) = a(Xˆ
K
j ) and a(XˆHr) = a(Xˆ
K
i ). Consequently,
each point of the line segment is included between a(XˆHp−1) and a(XˆHp) for
some p ≤ r. Thus, if the inclusion is strict, item p is split between Players i
and j, while the remaining ones in K are attributed in their entirety to one
player or the other.
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3.1 A classification of the Pareto faces
Faces on the Pareto surface are obtained when a given hyperplane is com-
patible with three or more different integer allocations of the goods. Under
MAC, this can take place only when the items are located on the disputing
segments of a given hyperplane and/or coincide with the hyperplane itself,
according to specific patterns listed below.
[f1] Faces corresponding to any β ∈
◦
RNS coinciding with an item
anj , j ∈ K, and no other goods on the disputing segments. In
such case item j can be assigned to any of the three players, while the
other items are univocally assigned according to the Pareto rule. The
face is a triangle, each vertex corresponding to a different assignment
of item j.
[f2] Faces corresponding to any β ∈
◦
RNS lying at the intersection
of the supporting segments of two s-independent items anj , a
n
k
with j, k ∈ K, and no other goods in that intersection. In this
case each of the items j and k can be shared between two players (with
only one players participating in the dispute of both items). The face is
a parallelogram with each vertex corresponding to a different allocation
of the pair of contested goods.
[f3] Faces corresponding to any β ∈
◦
RNS lying at the intersec-
tion of the supporting segments of three s-independent items
anj , a
n
k , a
n
l , with j, k, ` ∈ K, and no other goods in that intersec-
tion. In such case, each of the items j, k and ` can be shared between
two players (with each player participating in two disputes out of the
three). The corresponding face on the Pareto surface is a hexagon with
opposite sides paralel and of equal length. Therefore 6 out of the 8
points are vertices of the hexagon, while the remaining two points lie
in the interior of the face.
[f4] Faces corresponding to any β ∈
◦
RNS coinciding with any item
anj , j ∈ K, and a second item ank , k ∈ K that lies on a disputing
segment. The six different allocations produce a trapezoid, with the
two extra points lying on its larger base.
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[f5] Faces corresponding to any β ∈
◦
RNS lying at the intersection
of the supporting segments of two s-independent items anj , a
n
k
with j, k ∈ K, and an additional item anh, h ∈ K located in the
same position as the hyperplane. The 12 different allocations pro-
duce a face with 5 vertices and with two pairs of parallel edges with
unequal length. The largest edge of each pair contains two additional
points, while the remaining three points are in the interior of the face.
[f6] Faces corresponding to any β ∈
◦
RNS lying at the intersec-
tion of the supporting segments of three s-independent items
anj , a
n
k , a
n
` , with j, k, ` ∈ K, and an additional item anh, h ∈ K lo-
cated in the same position as the hyperplane. The 24 different
distributions produce hexagons with parallel opposite sides of unequal
length. The largest edge of each pair contains two additional points,
while the remaining 12 points are in the interior of the face.
When several goods lie on a single disputing segment, these can be re-
placed by a single good obtained by summing up utilities for each player,
and the situation can be traced back to one of the cases listed above.
Theorem 4. Under MAC, each face on the Pareto Frontier is identified by
one of the six characterizations listed in the above classification.
Proof. A face is formed when goods are located on the disputing segments of a
hyperplane in a way that three or more different goods’ allocations generate
unaligned points on the Pareto surface of the partition range. Moreover,
according to Lemma 1, when several goods lie on a disputing segment (given
a fixed common Pareto rule for the remaining goods) an edge on the Pareto
surface is produced and it is equivalent to the one that we obtain replacing
all those disputed goods with a single one by summing up utilities for each
player.
Based on these simple remarks, we notice that different faces are formed
depending on whether (a) the hyperplane coincides with a good in
◦
RNS and
(b) other items lie on one, two or all the disputing segments originated by
the same hyperplane. Therefore, six cases [(f1) through (f6)] are generated.
Let us analyze each case with the aid of Figure 3 through Figure 8.
In each of them, we move β that determines the PAR out of its original
location by a small step in the directions shown by the arrows. This corre-
sponds to a slight tilt of the supporting hyperplane on the Pareto surface, so
that the single edge becomes the only supporting region for the hyperplane.
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We obtain edges that are connected to each other and form a cycle. More-
over, every time we consider the hyperplane moving in opposite directions
in the RNS diagram (actually all cases but (f1)) we consider goods that are
contested between players with constant utility ratio. This yields parallel
edges of the faces. We distinguish between two cases:
• In cases (f2) and (f3), when moving the hyperplane in opposite direc-
tions, the contested good remains the same. In such cases the opposite
sides are not only parallel, but also of equal length1.
• In cases (f4), (f5) and (f6), the number of contested goods changes
from 1 to 2 when the opposite direction is taken. Correspondingly,
the length of the side changes, the larger side corresponding to the
case with two contested goods. The interior points on this larger side
correspond to the intermediate cases where one good is allotted to each
player2.
1As an example, let us analyze the case (f2) in Figure 4. Case (f2) corresponds to the
situation in which any b ∈ 42 lying at the intersection of the supporting segments of two
s-independent items aj , ak with j, k ∈ K, and no other goods in that intersection. Looking
at the geometrical representation in the simplex, we are able to identify four directions
(shown by black arrows and labeled by A, B, C and D) that correspond to a slight tilt of
the supporting hyperplane on the Pareto surface, so that the single edge becomes the only
supporting region for the hyperplane. They are opposite two by two; namely, A is opposite
to B and C is opposite to D. Moving towards A (see Figure 4b), the initial allocation
changes as follow: item 1 (in blue) ends to be disputed and is assigned to player III; item
2 (in red) is still disputed between players I and II. Two possible assignments are generated:
III, I and III, II; they are vertices of edge A. Moving towards the opposite direction B, the
initial allocation changes as follow: item 1 ends to be disputed and is assigned to player I;
item 2 is still disputed between players I and II. Two possible assignments are generated:
I,I and I, II; they are vertices of edge B. The contested good remains the same in both
cases; i.e., item 2. Applying an analogous reasoning, moving towards direction C and D
item 2 ends to be disputed and is assigned to player II or (player I, respectively); item 1 is
still contended between players I and III. Still, the contested good remains the same; i.e.,
item 1. Hence, we can conclude that edges generated by A and B are not only parallels
(since moving in opposite directions we have constant utility ratio across players) but also
of equal length (since the contested good remains the same). Same reasoning applies to
edges generated by C and D.
2As an example, let us analyze the case (f4) in Figure 6. Case (f4) corresponds to the
situation in which any b ∈ 42 coinciding with any item aj , j ∈ K, and a second item ak,
k ∈ K that lies on a disputing segment. Looking at the geometrical representation in the
simplex, we identify four directions (shown by black arrows and labeled by A, B, C and D)
that correspond to a slight tilt of the supporting hyperplane on the Pareto surface, so that
the single edge becomes the only supporting region for the hyperplane. Only two of them
are opposite directions; namely, C and D. Moving towards C (see Figure 6b) items 1 and
2 are still contested between players I and II; player III exits the dispute. Four possible
12
IIII
II
C
BA
good 1 (aj)
hyperplane (b)
(a) (f1) - RN Set
(1,0,0)
(0,0,1)
(0,1,0)
III
I
II
A
B
C
(b) Pareto Surface of P
Figure 3: Simplex and Pareto surface of P for face (f1).
Item j can be assigned to any of the three players, while the other items are univocally
assigned according to the Pareto rule. Hence, three possible allocations for the disputed
good are generated. The face is a triangle, each vertex corresponding to a different
assignment of item j.
The maximum number of faces is obtained when all items are s-independent,
and all the intersections of the disputing segments do not coincide with
goods in RNS. In such case only faces (f1) and (f2) are present, producing
k +
(
k
2
)
= (k(k + 1))/2 faces.
The classification of the faces on PF enables us to bound the number of
split items of any PO allocation.
Theorem 5. Under MAC, every Pareto optimal allocation can be obtained
under the following alternative conditions:
a) No good is split among the players
b) One good is split among at most three players
assignments are generated: I, II - I, I - II, I and II, II. Two of them (namely, I, I and II,
II) are vertices of edge C. The remaining two are points that lie on the same edge; their
respective position depends on the matrix of evaluation. Moving towards D (see Figure 6c)
item 1 ends to be disputed and it is assigned to player III; at the same time, item 2 is still
contested between player I and player II. Hence, two possible assignments are generated:
III, I and III, II. They are vertices of edge D. The number of contested goods is different
in the two analyzed directions.; namely, it is equal to two with respect to direction C and
equal to one with respect to direction D. As a result, edges generated by C and D are
parallel (since moving in opposite directions we have constant utility ratio across players)
but length of C is larger than length of D since in C the number of contested goods is
greater. The interior points on this larger side correspond to the intermediate cases where
one good is allotted to each player.
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IIII
II
B
D
C
A
good 1 (aj)
good 2 (ak)
hyperplane (b, b′)
(a) (f2) - RN Set
I
III
II
aj
ak
b
A
b′
(b) Moving towards A
I
III
II
aj
ak
b
B
b′
(c) Moving towards B
(1,0,0)
(0,0,1)
(0,1,0)
I, III II, III
I,I I, II
A
B
CD
(d) Pareto Surface of P
Figure 4: Simplex and Pareto surface of P for face (f2).
Both item j and item k can be shared between two players (with only one players par-
ticipating in the dispute of both items). The face is a parallelogram with each vertex
corresponding to a different allocation of the two contested items j and k.
c) Two goods are split, each one between two players
Proof. Case a occurs when the Pareto optimal allocation is also an integer
one. Otherwise, the allocation belongs to (at least) one of the faces (f1)
through (f6). If the face is of type (f1) or (f2), there is nothing to prove, and
we dealing with cases b and c, respectively.
Consider now any allocation X with value a(X) = (z1, z2, z3) on a face
(f3). Assume w.l.o.g. that the items are distributed according to the example
in Figure 5. For the sake of simplicity set γ1 = x11, γ2 = x22 and γ3 = x13.
Also, denote as r1, r2 and r3 the players’ allocation value for the remaining
goods (other then the first three) obtained with a Pareto rule compatible
with β = (β1, β2, β3). Any solution of the following linear system denotes an
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IIII
II
A
B
C
DE
F
good 1 (aj)
good 2 (ak)
good 3 (al)
hyperplane (b)
(a) (f3) - RN Set
(1,0,0)
(0,0,1)
(0,1,0)
III,III,I
I, III, I
I, II, I I, II, II
III, II, II
III, III, II
D
F
B
C
E
A
(b) Pareto Surface of P
Figure 5: Simplex and Pareto surface of P for face (f3).
Each of the items j, k and l can be shared between two players (with each player partic-
ipating in two disputes out of the three). Eight possible assignments are generated and
(consequently) eight points in the simplex; six of them are vertices of the hexagon, while
the remaining two points lie in the interior of the face.
allocation compatible with (z1, z2, z3)
γ1a11 + γ3a13 + r1 = z1
γ2a22 + (1− γ3)a23 + r2 = z2
(1− γ1)a31 + (1− γ2)a32 + r3 = z3
in the constraint region
R1 = {(γ1, γ2, γ3) ∈ R3 : 0 ≤ γ1, γ2, γ3 ≤ 1} .
The system, after proper rearrangement, becomes
a11γ1 +a13γ3 = z1 − r1
a22γ2 −a23γ3 = z2 − r2 − a23
−a31γ1 −a32γ2 = z3 − r3 − a31 − a32
.
Consider now the coefficient matrix
A =
 a11 0 a130 a22 −a23
−a31 −a32 0

Since good 1 is disputed between Players I and III, we have φ1a11 = φ3a31 >
φ2a21 ≥ 0, where (φ1, φ2, φ3) = RD(β). Moving to goods 2 and 3, we have
φ2a22 = φ3a32 > φ1a12 ≥ 0 and φ1a13 = φ2a23 > φ3a33 ≥ 0, respectively.
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II
A B
C
D
good 1 (aj)
good 2 (ak)
hyperplane (b, b′)
(a) (f4) - RN Set
I
III
II
b ≡ aj
ak
C
b’
(b) Moving towards C
I
III
II
b ≡ aj
ak
Db’
(c) Moving towards D
(1,0,0)
(0,0,1)
(0,1,0)
III,I III, II
I,I II,II
D
A
C
B
(d) Pareto Surface of P
Figure 6: Simplex and Pareto surface of P for face (f4).
Item j can be assigned to any of the three players; the second item k can be shared between
two players. Six different allocations are generated; they produce a trapezoid, with the
two extra points lying on its larger base.
Therefore, det(A) = a13a22a31−a11a23a32 = 0, det
[
a11 0
0 a22
]
= a11a22 > 0 and
rank(A) = 2.
Since the allocation lies in the face, the system is admissible, and the set
of solutions forms a line in R3, which intersects the border of R1 at least once
(actually twice). Any face of the border describes situations where at most
two goods are split, each between two players, that is case c. By virtue of
the last statement in (ii) of Lemma 1 the proof can easily be extended to the
case where several goods lie on the same disputing line.
Consider now an allocation with values a(X) = (z1, z2, z3) on an (f4) type
of face. Considering w.l.o.g. the distribution of goods described in Figure 6,
and denoting for simplicity ξ1 = x11, ξ2 = x21 and γ = x12, any allocation
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IIII
II
A
BC
DE
good 1 (aj)
good 2 (ak)
good 3 (al)
hyperplane (b)
(a) (f5) - RN Set
(1,0,0)
(0,0,1)
(0,1,0)
I, III, III
II, III, III
II, III, II
II, I, II
I, I, I
A
E
C
B
D
(b) Pareto Surface of P
Figure 7: Simplex and Pareto surface of P for face (f5).
Item j can be assigned to any of the three players; the second item k can be shared between
two players. The twelve different allocations produce a pentagonal face with five vertices
and with two pairs of parallel edges with unequal length. The largest edge of each pair
contains two additional points, while the remaining three points are in the interior of the
face.
I
III
II
A
B
C
DE
F
good 1 (aj)
good 2 (ak)
good 3 (al)
good 4 (am)
hyperplane (b)
(a) (f6) - RN Set
(1,0,0)
(0,0,1)
(0,1,0)
III, III, I, III III, III, II, III
III, II, II, II
I, II, II, III, II, I, I
I, III, I, I
A
E
CB
F
D
+ 12 internal points
(b) Pareto Surface of P
Figure 8: Simplex and Pareto surface of P for face (f6).
Item j can be assigned to any of the three players; the second item k can be shared
between two players. The twenty-four different distributions produce hexagons with
parallel opposite sides of unequal length. The largest edge of each pair contains two
additional points, while the remaining twelve points are in the interior of the face.
of goods 1 and 2 compatible with (z1, z2, z3) is a solution of the following
17
system 
ξ1a11 + γa12 + r1 = z1
ξ2a21 + (1− γ)a22 + r2 = z2
(1− ξ1 − ξ2)a31 + r3 = z3
in the constraint region (see Figure 9)
R2 = {(ξ1, ξ2, γ) ∈ R3 : 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, ξ1, ξ2 ≥ 0, ξ1 + ξ2 ≤ 1}
After proper rearrangement, the linear system becomes
a11ξ1 +a12γ = z1 − r1
a21ξ2 −a22γ = z2 − r2 − a22
−a31ξ1 −a31ξ2 = z3 − r3 − a31
Similarly to the previous case the coefficient matrix has rank 2 and the ad-
missible system has a set of solutions given by a line in R3, which intersects
the border of the closed and bounded admissibility region R2 at least once.
R2 has 5 faces. In case the solution belongs to one of the two faces (colored
in gray in Figure 9)
γ = 0 or 1, ξ1, ξ2 ≥ 0, ξ1 + ξ2 ≤ 1
we fall on case b. For the other 3 faces, namely
ξ1 = 0, 0 ≤ γ, ξ2 ≤ 1
ξ2 = 0, 0 ≤ γ, ξ1 ≤ 1
ξ1 + ξ2 = 1, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
we fall on case c. Notice that in the third case (corresponding to the shaded
rectangle in Figure 9), item 1 is split between Players 1 and 2. As before,
the extension to several goods on the same disputing line is guaranteed by
Lemma 1.
Moving to face (f5), we consider the goods’ distribution described in Fig-
ure 7. Setting γ1 = x11, γ2 = x12, ξ1 = x13 and ξ2 = x23 we must find a
solution of 
γ1a11 + γ2a12 + ξ1a13 + r1 = z1
(1− γ1)a21 + ξ2a23 + r2 = z2
(1− γ2)a32 + (1− ξ1 − ξ2)a33 + r3 = z3
in the constraint region
R3 = {(ξ1, ξ2, γ1, γ2) ∈ R4 : 0 ≤ γ1, γ2 ≤ 1, ξ1, ξ2 ≥ 0, ξ1 + ξ2 ≤ 1}
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Rearranging the terms of the system, we have
a11γ1 +a12γ2 +a13ξ1 = z1 − r1
−a21γ1 +a23ξ2 = z2 − r2 − a21
−a32γ2 −a33ξ1 −a33ξ2 = z3 − r3 − a32 − a33
The system is admissible with rank 2, and the set of solution forms a two-
dimensional subspace in R4. This set will intersect3 at least one of the two
dimensional faces composing the border of the closed and bounded constraint
region R3. If this solution belongs to one of the following faces
γ1 = 0 or 1
γ2 = 0 or 1
}
ξ1, ξ2 ≥ 0, ξ1 + ξ2 ≤ 1
we fall on case b. For the remaining faces, namely
γi = 0 or 1 (i = 1, 2)
ξh = 0 or 1 (h = 1, 2)
}
0 ≤ γj, ξk ≤ 1 (j 6= i, k 6= h)
ξ1 = ξ2 = 0, 0 ≤ γ1, γ2 ≤ 1
ξ1 + ξ2 = 1
γi = 0 or 1 (i = 1, 2)
}
0 ≤ γj ≤ 1 (j 6= i)
We fall on case c. In the last situation, item 3 is split between Players 1 and
2 and item i is split among the corresponding Players. The usual extension
to a larger number of item applies.
Suppose now that the allocation value (z1, z2, z3) belongs to face (f6).
Following the distribution in Figure 8, we let γ1 = x11, γ2 = x22, γ3 = x13,
ξ1 = x14 and ξ2 = x24, and we solve
γ1a11 + γ3a13 + ξ1a14 + r1 = z1
γ2a22 + (1− γ3)a23 + ξ2a24 + r2 = z2
(1− γ1)a31 + (1− γ2)a32 + (1− ξ1 − ξ2)a34 + r3 = z3
in the constraint region
R4 = {(ξ1, ξ2, γ1, γ2, γ3) ∈ R5 : 0 ≤ γ1, γ2, γ3 ≤ 1, ξ1, ξ2 ≥ 0, ξ1 + ξ2 ≤ 1}
Rearranging the terms, the system becomes
a11γ1 a13γ3 +a14ξ1 = z1 − r1
a22γ2 −a23γ3 +a24ξ2 = z2 − r2 − a23
−a31γ1 −a32γ2 −a34ξ1 −a34ξ2 = z3 − r3 − a31 − a32 − a34
3Each bidimensional object is the intersection of two hyperplanes. The intersection
between two bidimensional objects will be the intersection of four hyperplanes in R4 –
typically a point
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The system is admissible with rank 2, and the solution set is now tridimen-
sional. It must then intersect4 at least one of the following bidimensional
faces of the closed and bounded region
γ1 = 0 or 1
γ2 = 0 or 1
γ3 = 0 or 1
 ξ1, ξ2 ≥ 0, ξ1 + ξ2 ≤ 1
ξi = 0 or 1 (i = 1, 2)
γj = 0 or 1 (j = 1, 2, 3)
γh = 0 or 1 (h 6= j)
 0 ≤ ξk, γ` ≤ 1 (k 6= i, ` 6= j, h)
ξ1 + ξ2 = 1
γj = 0 or 1 (j = 1, 2, 3)
γh = 0 or 1 (h 6= j)
 0 ≤ γ` ≤ 1 (` 6= j, h)
The first type of face describes a type b situation, while all the other describe
a type c situation. The usual extension to a larger number of item applies.
Figure 9: The constraint region for face (f4)
4 The Pareto Boundary as a graph
We now show that RNS can be used to build a graph G = {V,E} where
each vertex v ∈ V is a face on the Pareto surface, and two vertices vi and
vj are connected by an arc
5 eij ∈ E if and only if the corresponding faces
4Here we consider the insersection of one bidimensional object with a tridimensional
one
5We prefer to use “arc” in place of the more common “edge” to avoid confusion with
the edges of a face on the Pareto surface.
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are adjacent, i.e. they share a common edge. The idea to build this graph
is simply to consider all the goods in RNS with their disputing segments.
The vertices V will consist of all the points in RNS coinciding with a good
or with an intersection of the dividing lines. Two vertices vi, vj ∈ V will be
connected by an arc eij ∈ E whenever there is supporting segment joining
the two vertices, with no other vertex of V in between. We refer to Figure
10(a) for an example of such graph. Theorem 4 shows that each vertex in V
represents a face on the Pareto surface. We now show that two vertices are
adjacent (i.e., share an arc) whenever the corresponding faces on the Pareto
surface are adjacent (i.e., share an edge).
Theorem 6. Under MAC, two faces on the upper border of P are adja-
cent, i.e. they share a common line segment, if and only if the corresponding
vertices vk and v` are joined by an arc in G.
Proof. First of all we prove that adjacent faces on the Pareto surface corre-
spond to vertices lying on the same disputing segment. In fact, each edge of
the faces (f1) through (f6) is obtained when are assigned first to one player
and then to another, while the allocation of the remaining goods remains
unchanged. In order for two different hyperplanes to support the same edge,
both hyperplanes must have the same disputing segment in common. There-
fore one of them must lie on the supporting segment of the other, and, as a
consequence they have to be connected by a disputing segment. Also, two
faces cannot be associated with vertices on the same supporting segment sep-
arated by a third vertex. For, in such a case they would have no allocation
and, a fortiori, no edge in common.
We now show that every two adjacent vertices on G correspond to adjacent
faces on the Pareto surface. In fact, consider any two adjacent vertices vi.vj ∈
V and take the hyperplane placed on the midpoint of the arc eij connecting
the two vertices. Whatever the type of face represented by vi and vj, the
hyperplane touches the Pareto surface on an edge obtained by allocating the
goods on both sides of the disputing segment aligned with the edge. The two
faces associated to vi and vj (respectively) have the same edge in common,
since they are both compatible with the allocation of the goods provided by
the midpoint hyperplane. We refer to Figure 10(b) for an illustration of the
proof.
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Figure 10: (a) The graph formed by 5 goods. (b) A sketch of the last part of the proof
in Theorem 6. Three hyperplanes, those centered at vi, vj and their midpoint, share the
same two allocations, with all the goods but that in vi allocated according to the Pareto
rule of the midpoint hyperplane, and the good in vi allocated first to player 1 and then to
player 3
5 Algorithms
5.1 A simple algorithm
We now consider a function g˜ : RNS → [0, 1] defined for each β ∈ RNS as
g˜(β) = g(RD(β))
this function, in particular is defined for every vertex of the graph g˜(v).
The following Theorem shows that it suffices to check the value of g˜ on the
face/vertices only. Moreover, the function g˜ inherits the convexity property
of g according to which it suffices to show that g˜ is a ”local” minimum (i.e.
a minimum w.r.t. the adjacent vertices) to make it a global optimum.
Theorem 7. Under MAC, a face/vertex v∗ containing the egalitarian ray
has the following properties
i) It is the global minimum for g
g˜(v∗) ≤ g˜(v) for any v ∈ V (3)
ii) It suffices to show that it is a local minimum for g:
g˜(v∗) ≤ g˜(v′) for any v′ adjacent to v∗ (4)
Proof. (i) The PO-EQ allocation belongs to one or more Pareto faces. Ac-
cording to Theorem 2 (iii) one of the miniming argoments of g (and therefore
of g˜) will correspond to such Pareto face. The corresponding vertex on the
graph will be associated to the same absolute minimum.
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(ii) We need to prove two preliminary claims.
We consider two hyperplanes: H(face) passing through a Pareto face, and
H(edge) passing through an edge of the face. Denote with g(face), g(edge)
resp., the value of g corresponding to H(face), H(edge) resp., and denote
with `ed the line intersection of the the two (non parallel) hyperplanes con-
taining the edge. Consider now the following projections on NPB, obtained
by normalizing the points in the geometrical object: pface, ped, peq, projec-
tions of the Pareto face, the line `ed and the bisector, respectively. We prove
the following claims:
Claim 1a If pface and peq are on the same side ped (see Figure 11, left) then
g(edge) ≥ g(face);
Claim 1b If pface and peq are on opposite sides of ped (see Figure 11, right)
then g(edge) ≤ g(face);
Figure 11: The two cases for claim 1
Proof of Claims 1a and 1b. (1a) Suppose g(edge) < g(face). Then the hy-
perplane H(edge) passes through the edge and g(edge)(1, 1, 1), separating P
from the Pareto face and g(face)(1, 1, 1) (see Figure 12, left) – a contradic-
tion. (1b) Suppose g(edge) > g(face). Then the hyperplane H(edge) passes
through the edge and g(edge)(1, 1, 1), separating P from the Pareto face and
g(face)(1, 1, 1) (see Figure 12, right) – again a contradiction.
As a consequence of these claims suppose g˜(v′) < g˜(v′′) for two adjacent
faces, then, projecting the Pareto face v′, the line containing the edge and
the bisector on NPB, the projected Pareto face and the projected bisector
must lie on the same side of the projected line.
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Figure 12: Proofs of Claims 1a and 1b
Claim 2. Suppose g˜(v′) = g˜(v′′) for two adjacent faces. Then the bisector
intesects the line generated by the common edge.
Proof of Claim 2. Denote with H(v′), H(v′′) resp., the hyperplane passing
through face v′, face v′′ resp. Since v′ 6= v′′, the two hyperplanes are neither
parallel nor coincident and intesect in a line `ed that includes the common
edge. Suppose the bisector does not meet the line. Then the two hyperplanes
H(v′) and H(v′′) have more than three non aligned points in common: those
in `ed and g(v
′)(1, 1, 1). Being distinct hyperplanes this is impossible. The
bisector must meet the common line `ed.
To prove the theorem we distinguish three cases:
Case 1 (4) holds with strict inequality sign for all the adjacent edges.
Consider the projection of the the faces and the bisector on NPB. For
each adjacent edge, the Pareto face and the bisector lie on the same
side of the line generated by the edge. The projected bisector must
belong to the projected bisector and the same is true on the Pareto
Boundary. By theorem 2 (iii) v∗ is an absolute minimum of g, and
therefore of g˜.
Case 2 (4) holds with strict inequality sign for all the adjacent edges, but
one g˜(v∗) = g˜(v′′).
Considering the projections on NPB, the bisector and the Pareto face v∗
must lie on the same side of each line generated by all the adjacent edges
different from v′′. Moreover the bisector must lie on the (projected)
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line generated by the edge between the faces v∗ and v′′. Once again the
bisector meets the Pareto face v∗, and the theorem holds.
Case 3 (4) holds with g˜(v∗) = g˜(v′′) for two or more adjacent vertices v′′.
The bisector must belong to all the lines generates by the edges of the
adjacent faces for which equality holds. The bisector belongs to their
intersection which must be a vertex of the face. Once again the bisector
meets the Pareto face v∗, and the theorem holds.
The theorem suggests the following simple algorithm
5.2 A simple algorithm
The following algorithm is based on theorem 7.
Beginning Start from any v0 ∈ V (For instance the one closest to the
center in RNS)
Body For the current vk ∈ V , compute the value g˜(v′) any adjacent vertex
v′:
• If (4) holds =⇒ vk is optimal =⇒ End
• Otherwise move towards the adjacent vertex vk+1 with lowest
value of g˜. =⇒ Repeat step with vk+1.
End From the optimal vertex/face =⇒ find the optimal allocation.
Theorem 8. The simple algorithm converges in a finite number of steps.
Proof. There is a finite number of vertices in the graph, and the algorithm
cannot cycle.
5.3 Steepest descent along the graph
Moving along the edge from (c1, c2, c3) to
(
c1 + ε, c2 − c2c2+c3 ε, c3 − c3c2+c3 ε
)
,
with 0 < ε < c2 + c3, note that
c2 − c2c2+c3 ε
c3 − c3c2+c3 ε
=
c2
(
1− ε
c2+c3
)
c3
(
1− ε
c2+c3
) = c2
c3
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i.e. the ratio remains the same, and the new point is on the supporting
segment joining (c1, c2, c3) to the vertex of Player I.
We now investigate what happens to the corresponding hyperplane coef-
ficients.
Lemma 2. If S(ε) = (s1, s2, s3) denotes the variation of the hyperplane
coefficients, i.e.
S(ε) := RD
(
c1 + ε, c2 − c2
c2 + c3
ε, c3 − c3
c2 + c3
ε
)
−RD(c1, c2, c3)
then
S(ε) = δ(ε)(−c2 − c3, c2, c3)
where
δ(ε) =
c2c3ε
(c2c3 + c1c2 + c1c3)(c1(c2 + c3) + c22c3 + c2c
2
3 + ε(c
2
3 + c
2
2 + c2c3))
Proof. Verify it with Mathematica
The shifts along the RNS cause an analogous shift in the hyperplane
coefficients, but in the opposite direction: To an increase in c1, there corre-
sponds a decrease in b1, and, conversely, a decrease in c2 and c3 determines
an increase in the corresponding hyperplane coefficients b2 and b3.
The shift in b is not linear. This implies that the value of the function g
will not change linearly. Instead of shoosing an arbitary value for ε, we may
consider the instantaneous rate of change at ε = 0
δ′(0) =
c2c3
(c2 + c3)(c2c3 + c1(c2 + c3))2
Therefore we will consider the following variations in the hyperplane coeffi-
cients
δ′(0)(−c2 − c3, c2, c3)
Note also that a similar in the other direction is obtained by reversing signs.
Similarly, shifts along other supporting signs are obtained by replacing the
roles of c1, with that of c2 (c3, resp.) if the supporting segment toward Player
II (Player III, resp.) is considered.
Whatever shift is considered, denote with s1, s2 and s3 the variation in
the hyperplane coefficients, with s1 + s2 + s3 = 0. Assuming that the shift
does not take to a point out of RNS, the variation in g is given by
∆g˜ =
∑
i∈N
siai(X
−
i ) +
∑
j∈dg(c)
max
i∈dp(j)
{siaij}
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where X−i denotes the goods that, according to PAR(c) are allocated to
Player i without disputing (and do not belong to a disputing line of c), dg(c)
denotes the set of disputing goods in c, and dp(j) denotes the set of disputing
players for good j.
In case (s1, s2, s3) = δ
′(0)(−c2 − c3, c2, c3) we can define the directional
derivative dg
d~`
= ∆g˜ of g˜ in the direction ~` towards pl.I. Similar definitions
can be given for the other admissible directions from a given face/vertex v.
5.4 A more subtle algorithm
The following algorithm is based on a steepest descent rule:
Beginning Start from any v0 ∈ V (For instance the one closest to the
center in RNS)
Body For thecurrent vk ∈ V , compute the directional derivative towards
any adjacent vertex vj:
• If dg
d~`
≥ 0 towards any adjacent vj =⇒ vk is optimal =⇒ End
• If dg
d~`
< 0 towards some adjacent vj =⇒Move towards the adjacent
vertex vk+1 with lowest derivative. =⇒ Repeat step with vk+1.
End From the optimal vertex/face =⇒ find the optimal allocation.
Theorem 9. The algorithm converges in a finite number of steps
Proof. There is a finite number of vertices in the graph, and the algorithm
cannot cycle.
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